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Abstract 
This paper complements Rehme (1995) and reconsiders the trade-
off between growth and redistribution in a two-country world with 
endogenous growth, tax competition, and capital income cum in-
vestment subsidy tax scheme, perfect capital mobility, extreme in-
vestment behaviour, two classes in each country and governments 
with opposing preferences. It is shown that in a closed economy 
this tax scheme allows higher growth than a wealth tax scheme 
if the capital owners are sufficiently impatient. Also, a left-wing 
government's country grows faster than a right-wing government's 
one. In a two-country world with equal technological efficiency, 
no redistribution takes place and both countries act as left-wing 
governments for fear of capital flight. With efficiency differences 
the efficient country will always get all the capital. The right-
wing government cannot use its domestically preferred policy. An 
efficient left-wing government can redistribute out of its efficiency 
advantage vis-a-vis a right or left-wing opponent and experience 
high growth. Efficient right and left-wing governments' countries 
grow at the same rate. 
*I would like to thank Tony Atkinson, Berthold Herrendorf, Jim Mirrlees, Akos 
Valentinyi and Robert Waldmann for helpful comments and discussions. Of course, 
all errors are my own. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper reconsiders the trade-off between growth and redistribution 
policies in a two-country world with tax competition and perfect capital 
mobility as presented in Rehme (1995). There it is shown that capital 
flight forces governments with opposing political preferences ('right vs. 
left-wing') to pursue growth maximizing ('right-wing') policies if there are 
no efficiency differences and the two countries use the source principle and 
a wealth tax base. So governments that act in the interest oflabour ('left-
wing') will be threatened to loose their capital stock which provides the 
basis for redistribution. It is then shown that redistribution and positive 
growth is only feasible if efficiency differences are present. 
This paper complements the results of that paper. Again the set-up 
follows the analysis presented in Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1994) .1 The 
reasons for adopting the source principle are the same as before, namely, 
that a government in a non-cooperative environment cannot perfectly 
monitor its residents' income. 
First, it will be assumed that the tax base for the government is 
designed as a capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme. The 
tax rate on income and investment is assumed to be equal.2 This appears 
to be a very special arrangement at first sight, but it may be justified 
by the following observation. A right-wing government acts in the inter-
ests of capital owners ('Capitalists'), consequently it would wish to set 
the income tax rate equal to zero. Since the presence of a Barro-type 
production function is assumed where public investment feeds back into 
production, it would also like to subsidize investment as much as possi-
ble. So setting the tax rate on income and investment equal seems to be 
a rational choice. 
Similar reasoning applies for a 'left-wing' government. It would 
1 Bertola (1991), (1993) derives similar results as those obtained by Alesina and 
Rodrik. 
2 For simplicity and in order to elucidate the effect of that tax we will abstract 
from wage taxes throughout. Also note that Workers are not assumed to invest, but 
instead consume all their income, cf. Kaldor (1956) and Bertola (1991). 
wish to set a very high tax rate on capital income for redistributive 
reasons. But this hinders investment, where we recall that in a simple 
endogenous growth model ala Barro (1990) and Romer (1986) 'Work-
ers' enjoy ever increasing wages along a balanced growth path. Thus, 
a left-wing government would have to strike a balance between financ-
ing investment and redistribution, possibly out of capital income taxes. 
Hence, setting the tax rate equal again appears to be a rational choice. 
Having attempted to justify the uniform tax rate on capital income 
and investment subsidy the paper simply assumes this uniform tax rate. 
Recall that the source principle requires that all incomes originating 
in a country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of 
the income recipients. As before, we will allow for non-uniform taxes. 
Then the following results can be obtained: 
In a closed economy a capital income cum investment subsidy tax 
s<;heme allows higher growth than a wealth tax scheme if the capital 
owners are sufficiently impatient. Thus, this paper's tax base appears 
conducive to high growth given impatience. 
In a closed economy a left-wing government's country grows faster 
than a right-wing government's one. The left-wing government becomes 
the growth maximizer. Notice that in Alesina and Rodrik (1991) the 
right-wing government is the growth maximizer. 
Extending the analysis to a two country world we will contemplate 
a simple Tax Competition Game the precise form of which is presented 
below. The Nash Equilibria of this game lead to these results: 
In a two-country world with equal technological efficiency across 
countries, no redistribution takes place and both countries optimally act 
as left-wing countries for fear of capital flight. You may note that in 
Rehme (1995) it is shown that both countries act as right-wing govern-
ments in the presence of wealth taxes. 
Since it is very unlikely ever to find countries almost identical this 
result provides a benchmark for the case where the countries are different 
in terms of efficiency. 
.2 
If the two countries are differently efficient, the efficient country will 
always get all the capital. The right-wing country will have to abandon 
its preferred policy towards the Capitalists, that is, it cannot use the tax 
choice for its preferred growth rate. The reason is that the right-wing 
government is constrained by not hurting the Capitalists in terms of their 
utility on the one hand and loosing capital on the other. An efficient left-
wing country can redistribute out of its efficiency difference vis-a-vis a 
right or left-wing opponent and experience high growth. It is also shown 
that efficient right or left-wing governments will grow at the same rate. 
From this last result one may conclude that given strategic inter-
action efficiency differences may matter a lot. Given the tax scheme 
this paper employs there then appears no real trade-off problem between 
growth and redistribution. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model 
set-up, derives the equilibrium for a closed ·economy and compares the 
optimal tax choices with those obtained by Alesina and Rodrik (1991). 
Section 3 formulates a dynamic game where governments with possibly 
opposing political preferences engage in competition for capital by setting 
tax rates. Two propositions state the main results of this section. Section 
4 draws some conclusions. Finally, proofs of the propositions may be 
found in the appendix. 
2 The Model 
Consider a Two-Country World with a "domestic" and a "foreign" coun-
try. Let us denote variables in the foreign country by a (*). There 
are two kinds of many identical individuals in each country, those who 
own capital and no labour and those who own labour, but no capital. 
Let us call the latter Workers (W) and the former Capitalists (k). The 
Workers consume domestic consumption goods only and derive utility 
U(Cf) = ln Cf. The Capitalists are assumed to consume a mixture 
of domestic { C1) and foreign ( C2 ) consumption goods, which are substi-
tutes. Their overall consumption is Cf = Cft + c;t. Their utility is given 
3 
by U( Cf) = ln Cft + ln C~t· 
Hence, both agents derive utility from the consumption of homo-
geneous, malleable goods that are produced in the two countries. This 
assumes that foreign and domestic output, yt and ~* are perfect substi-
tutes in consumption. 
Those who own capital, own shares of two representative firms. A 
fum is assumed a production unit only. It takes the following important 
form: 
"' AK"'G1-"'L1-"' h L t = t t t , w ere 0<a<1 (1) 
(2) 
where yt is output produced in the home country, Kt the overall domesti-
cally installed real capital stock, kt ( k;) is the real capital stock owned by 
domestic (foreign) Capitalists, Gt are public inputs to production and A 
is an efficiency parameter, which is assumed constant over time. We will 
set Lt = 1, so that labour is supplied inelastically over time. Throughout 
the analysis we will abstract from problems arising from depreciation and 
population growth. 
Unless stated otherwise it is assumed that A = A* so that both 
countries are equally efficient. I will call these economies similar. If this 
does not hold, I will refer to the countries as being different. 
We will assume that the Capitalists and the Workers are spatially 
immobile so that they cannot move from one country to the other. The 
consumption and capital goods in contrast travel freely across countries. 
The Capitalists have to decide where they wish to invest. The 
variable Wt E [0, 1] denotes the fraction of real capital at date t owned by 
domestic Capitalists invested in the home country. The fraction 1 --Wt 
is invested abroad by the domestic Capitalists. Similar reasoning applies 
to the foreign Capitalists.3 
3 Note that this formulation allows for the case that all of the domestically owned 
capital is invested abroad. This serves to bring out the effect of capital flight more 
clearly. Alternatively we could have assumed that w E [q, 1] where q is a- possibly-
small number. The results of the paper would not change in any significant way. 
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Note that we assume that foreign and domestic. capital are substi-
tutes. This abstracts from the possibility that e.g. foreign capital may 
be a necessary input for domestic production.4 
From now on the subscript t will be dropped whenever it is clear 
that the variables in question and the ones derived from them depend on 
time. 
This form of a production function has been introduced by Barro 
(1990). We may note that in the absence of a government a Closed 
Economy breaks down and the Workers and the Capitalists sta.rVe. 
2.1 The Public Sector 
The governments in both countries choose to tax capital income and grant 
an investment tax subsidy. Let 81 be the tax rate on real capital income 
which is held domestically by domestic investors. Thus, 81 is levied on 
wrk. The government also grants an investment subsidy of B1wk, i.e. it 
subsidizes investment undertaken at home at the rate 81 . Real foreign 
capital income invested in the home country, i.e. (1- w*)rk* is taxed at 
the rate 82 • This rate also determines the investment subsidy for foreign 
capital, (1- w*)k*.5 We will assume that there is always some form of 
taxation and that it is impossible to tax all income. For simplicity we 
let B; E [v, 1- v] where vis small. 
Analogous definitions hold for the foreign government. This way 
of taxing wealth means that the countries adopt a variant of the Source 
Principle as a tax rule. 
The Source Principle implies that all types of wealth present in a 
country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the 
owners of wealth. 
4 As it is the aim of this paper to model competition for capital, assuming comple-
mentarity would only exacerbate the competition, but would not change the results 
of this paper in any fundamental way. 
5Thus, this paper considers the special case where the tax rates on capital income 
and the investment subsidy are equal. 
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If capital is internationally mobile it makes sense to adopt this 
principle since governments in a non-cooperative environment cannot 
perfectly monitor their residents' wealth. We still allow for non-uniform 
tax rates which the principle rules out in order to concentrate on the 
· instruments that are at the governments' disposal. 
At this stage let us define T as the average tax rate levied on the 
overall capital income cum investment subsidy in the economy. Given the 
Barro-type production function we can then define the following govern-
ment budget constraint, which is assumed to be balanced at each point 
in time: 
rK=G+>..rK (3) 
The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS public expenditures. 
The Workers receive >..rk as transfers and G is spent on public inputs to 
production.6 
Rearranging we consequently contemplate the following budget con-
straint: 
G-=(1->..)rK (4) 
Underlying this is our earlier definition of the average tax rate T, 
which we have deliberately left unspecified yet. Its explicit specification 
will be derived below. 
2.2 Property Structure and Firms 
There are many identical firms in each country which operate in a per-
fectly competitive environment. A representative firm is assumed to be 
a profit maximizer. The firms are owned by domestic and foreign capital 
owners. Foreign and domestic Capitalists rent capital to and demand 
6 Note that r(l- >.) = G/K so that T = r(K(k, k*)). Also, Y is homogeneous of 
degree 1 in k and k* so that T is homogeneous of degree 0 in k and k*. Thus if K 
increases by some factor t/1, T will remain constant so that r will remain constant as 
well. 
6 
T 
shares of the representative domestic firm. The same holds for the for-
eign firm. The domestic Capitalists' assets are their shares of the two 
representative firms. The shares of the two firms are collateralized one-
to-one by physical capital. The markets for assets, physical capital and 
labour are assumed to clear at each point in time so that the represen-
tative domestic firm faces a path of a uniform, market clearing rental 
rate, {rt}, of domestically installable capital, K and wage rate, { Wt}, for 
labour. 
Given perfect competition the firms in the domestic economy rent 
capital and hire labour in spot market in each period in their country. 
We assume that foreign and domestic output are perfect substitutes and 
set the price of Y and Y* equal to 1. Given constant returns to capital 
and labour, factor payments exhaust output. Profit maximization then 
entails that firms pay each factor of production its marginal product 
r = 8Yj8K = aA[(l- .\)r]l-"' (5) 
w = 8Yj8K := 'TJ(r,.\)K = (1- a)A[(l- .\)r]1-"'K, L = 1. (6) 
Note that (5) implies that there is an intra-country arbitrage at 
work which makes the return on foreign and domestic capital installed 
in each firm equal in the domestic country. The same, of course, applies 
to the foreign country. 
We see that the average tax rate has a bearing on the marginal 
product of capital which is set equal to the rental rate of capital, i.e. the 
rate of return for the Capitalists, by the firms if the capital market is in 
equilibrium. 
2.3 Capitalists 
There are many identical Capitalists in each country, who cannot move, 
and choose how much of their income they consume or invest. Each 
individual Capitalist has to take prices such as r as given. 
Since they have the opportunity to invest in either country they 
have to determine where their investment is to take place, w. Note that 
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we have assumed that the Capitalists consume a mixture of the consump-
tion goods and that this mixture depends on where the the Capitalists 
invest. 
We will assume that it is costless to send and install capital abroad 
so that perfect capital mobility between the countries prevails. This as-
sumption may be justified by the fact that we have assumed that physical 
capital is entirely collateralized by stocks that are traded. Then perfect 
capital mobility amounts to a situation where the world capital market 
is taken to be fully integrated, which for some countries and assets seems 
to be a reasonable approximation of reality. 
A representative Capitalist is assumed to maximize his/her in-
tertemporal utility according to the following programme taking prices 
and tax rates as given. 
s.t. 
00 
lf<lf J (Inc~ +Inc;) e-ptdt 
Ct,C2,w 0 
. Ck Ck 
k = wrk + (1- w)r*k- --1----2 -
1- B1 1- o; 
o:::;w:::;1 
k(O) = k, k( oo) =free. 
(7) 
(8) 
{9) 
(10) 
Equation {8) is the dynamic budget constraint of the representative 
Capitalist. It consists of two parts. The Capitalists consume Cf home 
consumption goods, where Ck is the Capitalists' overall, that is, foreign 
and domestic goods consumption at timet. Cf equals (1- B1)w[rk- k] 
from our earlier assumption that goods are consumed proportionately to 
where they are produced. Noting that the Capitalists only derive income 
where they invest and solving fork, the overall investment, yields (8). 
With this budget constraint we also reflect the fact that the rep-
resentative Capitalist has to take r and r* as given since we assumed 
earlier on that the asset and capital markets clear at all times. 
The necessary first order conditions for this problem are given by 
.8 
I 
l 
(8), (9), (10) and the following equations: 
1 1 
Cf - /L (1 - 81) = O 
1 1 c~ - 1L (1 - Bi) = 0 
p(rk- r*k) = 0 
jL = /LP - p[wr + (1 - w )r*] 
lim kpe-pt = 0 
t->co 
(lla) 
(llb) 
(llc) 
(lld) 
(He) 
where /L is a positive co-state variable which can be interpreted as the 
instantaneous shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. 
Equation (lla) and (llb) equate the marginal utility of consumption to 
the shadow price of more investment, (lld) is the standard Euler equation 
which relates the costs of foregone investment (LHS) to the discounted 
gain in marginal utility (RHS) and (lle) is the transversality condition 
for the capital stock which ensures that the capital stock does not grow 
without bound asymptotically. 
Equation (llc) describes the Capitalists' investment decision and 
its solution takes a" bang-bang'' form7 • From this the Capitalists invest 
in the following way: 
r > r* 
r = r* 
r < r*. 
(12) 
Thus, the investors compare marginal gains obtainable in each country. 
To see this more clearly take the condition for w = 1. This can be read 
ass 
MB of more income at home > MB of more income abroad 
Thus, the Capitalists' investment behaviour is extreme in that they 
immediately shift their capital to the country. where the net marginal 
. 
7 :For a more detailed treatment of this problem cf. eg. Chiang (1992), Kamien 
and Schwartz (1991). 
8MB= marginal benefit. 
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benefit of investment, that is, where the gross rate of return is higher. 
That replicates the simplifying assumption that capital can costlessly 
be transferred to other countries. This simple formulation allows one 
to concentrate on the observation that international return differentials 
induce capital flows in the direction indicated above.9 
Then (12) implies that the solution for w is independent of time. 
For the moment assume that 81 , e; are also independent of time. Taking 
logarithms and then time derivatives of {lla) and (llb) together with 
{lld) implies 
'Y = CkjCk = Cf/Cf = c~;c; = kjk = [wr +.(1- w)r*]- p. {13) 
Domestic consumption is given by Cf = [rwk-wkj(1-B1 ). Dividing 
this expression by k yields Cf /k = [wr- w-y](1- 81). Substituting for 7 
and rearranging yields 
Cf = ((1- w)(r- r*) + p) wk(1- 81). {14) 
From this and {12) we learn what goods the Capitalists consume, namely 
If r > r* then Cf = pk(1 - 81), · 
Ifr<r* then Cf=O, 
Ifr = r* then Cf = wpk(1- BI), 
Ck -0 2- . 
c~ = pk(1 - e;). 
c; = (1- w)pk(1- e;). 
(15) 
Then, depending on the net benefit in the two countries, we g~t a 
steady state growth rate of consumption which follows in a standard way 
from (lld) and {12): 
Case 1: w=O: 
Case 2: wE [0,1]: 
Case 3: w=1: 
'Y1 = r*- p 
'Y2 = WT + (1 - W )r* - p 
'Ya=r-p 
{16) 
It follows that consumption of the Capitalists grows at a rate which 
depends on the net marginal benefit in the two countries. Note that for 
9For an example that physical capital may actually be transferred because of return 
differentials see Ruffin (1984). 
10 
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Case 1 the growth rate is completely determined by the return in the 
foreign country and all the domestic capital "bangs" into the foreign 
country. If w > 0, however, part of the domestic capital remains in the 
home country, but this implies that the net marginal benefits in the two 
countries must be equal. Case 2 is of particular interest below. Note that 
we have allowed w to go where it would like if the net benefits are equal. 
Thus if the latter are equal we may well observe that all the capital of 
e.g. the home country bangs into the foreign country (Case 1) or entirely 
remains at home (Case 3). In Case 3 all the growth takes place in the 
home country, if the net benefit is higher there. This completely describes 
the behaviour of the Capitalists. 
2.4 Workers 
The Workers are assumed to derive a utility stream from consuming their 
wages. They do not invest ·and they are not taxed by assumption.10 Thus, 
their intertemporal utility is given by 
00 j U(Cw) e-6tdt where cw = 'TJ(T, >.)K + >.rK. (17) 
0 
This assumption is reminiscent of growth models such as Kaldor 
(1956), where different proportions of profits and wages are saved. In the 
extreme case Capitalists save and Workers do not, which is the " Clas-
sical Savings Rule". In Kaldorian models the Capitalists' investment 
decision is determined by the exogenously given growth rate. Recently, 
Bertola (1993) has derived the" Classical Savings Rule" result from utility 
maximization, which endogenizes the investment decisions and therefore 
the growth rate. In that sense our set-up reflects this result. However, 
Bertola does not use a two class model and there are important differ-
ences to post-Keynesian models of growth, the most important of which 
is probably that the causality in both approaches is running in opposite 
10Negative values for >. would be tantamount to wage taxes or taxes on human 
capital. In order to focus on the effects of capital taxation we will abstract from any 
effects of wage taxes on our economies. 
11 
directions. Whereas in Kaldorian models the growth rate determines the 
factor share incomes, in endogenous growth models the direction is rather 
from factor shares to the growth rate. 
2.5 Taxation 
Given the dynamic behaviour of the Capitalists we may now specify the 
average tax rate r which we have simply postulated in section 2~1. Recall 
that the tax revenues are given by B1w(rk-k)+B2(1-w*)(rk*-k*). But 
given the optimci.l behaviour of the Capitalists, equation (15) establishes 
that the tax revenues are equivalent to wpB1k + (1- w*)p*B2k*. 
Thus, the tax arrangement amounts to a tax on consumption.11 In 
terms of implementability we will still refer to income taxes cum invest-
ment subsidy. The average tax rate r is then given by 
wpB1k + (1- w*)p*B2k* 
r= . 
wk + (1- w*)k* (18) 
One may then verify that for given w, w* the effect of changes in policy 
parameters is given by 
(19) 
so that increases in taxes raise and increased distribution lowers the rate 
of return or wages. 
Let t:::.. = a(1 - a)A[·]-"'(1- >.). Then we get a rather more am-
biguous picture for capital flows 
8r = t:::.. [(pB1 - p*B2)w(1 - w*)k*] > O if B .<! *B 
8k [(2 < p 1 <p 2· (20) 
Thus the effect of more domestic capital on the interest rate depends on 
government parameters. Equivalently, for k* we get 
8r = t:::.. [(p*B2 - pB1)w(1 - w*)k] > O if *B .<! B 
8k* [(2 < P 2<P 1· (21) 
11Thus, we are in fact contemplating a Ramsey Ta:r: Problem, cf. Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1989), chpt. 12. 
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The equations (20) and (21) capture the fact that the capital that flows 
into the country should be taxed more heavily ceteris paribus since it 
provides the basis for more public inputs to production. 
2.6 Equilibrium 
2.6.1 Closed Economy 
In the Closed Economy w = 1, el = e2 = T, K = k, ct = Ck. The agents 
take the parameters and the prices as given. 
The overall resource constraint in our economy is: 
I= k = rk+ (rJ+A.r)k -Ck- cw. (22) 
Since the Workers' consumption is cw = ('fJ + >..r)k, '<It this constraint is 
binding. This simplifies (22) to 
• k k = rk- C. (23) 
From (13) we already know that /ek = 'Yk· The assumption that 
the tax parameters are independent of time is still assumed to hold. Then 
we also have that 'Yew = /k from above. 
The rental rate, r, is given by (5) and is constant by (18), hence 
/ek is constant. In steady state all variables are supposed to grow at the 
same constant rate. To verify that this is the case consider (1). Use the 
definition of G, that is, G = (1- >..)rk, and substitute in (1). Recalling 
that Lt = 1 and taking logarithms and time derivatives yields 'YY = /k· 
Hence, ill steady state we have balanced growth with' 
'YY = 'Yk = /ek = 'Yew. 
This describes the dynamic equilibrium of the Closed Economy. 
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2.6.2 Two-Country World 
In this section we will only make a few observations on the nature of 
the equilibrium in the presence of arbitrarily. given tax rates under the 
assumption of identical technologies, A= A*. We can have the following 
situations for the domestic country: 01 > 82, 81 < 82 or 81 = 82. Thus, we 
would have to go through six domestic vs. foreign tax rate configurations, 
noting that the levels of the tax rates have been unspecified and using 
symmetry. If we partition w E [0, 1] into w1 = 0, w2 E (0, 1), and 
w3 = 1 and similarly w* and invoke symmetry we have six possible w, w* 
configurations. 
The determination of w, w* is crucial for the description of the equi-
librium of the two-country world. Given the above possibilities one would 
have to go through 36 possible cases.Since w depends on max(r, r*) in 
the way given by (12) and the level of the tax rates has been left un-
specified it stands to reason that any w, w* can be sustained as a possible 
equilibrium. This is especially true if there are great differences in the 
levels. For instance if 01 - 02 > 0~ - 02 and since r, r* are increasing in 
tax rates then (w = 1,w* = 0) so that capital flight occurs. 
I have tried to argue that almost all w, w* configurations can be 
sustained given arbitrary levels and combinations of the tax rates and 
conclude from the above that each w, w* combination can be sustained 
by multiple tax rate combinations and that these combinations constitute 
an extremely large, possibly infinite space of possible equilibria. 
Economically, this suggests that we cannot say very interesting 
things about the economies unless we put more restrictions on the way 
taxes are set, which is the objective of the tax competition game we will 
contemplate below. 
2.7 The Government in a Closed Economy 
As in Alesinaand Rodrik (1991), (1994) we will now look at a government 
that cares about the two groups in a closed economy. We will consider 
the domestic economy. Respecting the right of private property, it has to 
. 14 
I 
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choose the paths of r and >. in order to solve the following intertemporal 
problem, which is taken from the model of Alesina and Rodrik {1991): 
00 00 
max (1- f3) j1nck e-ptdt + f3 j1ncw e-6tdt 
r,>. 
0 0 
s.t. Ck = pk(1- r) 
cw =.1J(·)k + >.rk 
k = -y(r, >.)k 
>.~o 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
{27) 
(28) 
The parameter f3 E [0, 1] represents the welfare weight attached to 
the two groups in the economy. If f3 = 1, (0), the government cares about 
the Workers (Capitalists) only. I will refer to the government's choice of 
f3 as being a 
f3 = 1, (0) - left-wing (right-wing) government 
Note that the condition >. ~ 0 restricts the governments in such a 
way that even a right-wing government does not tax workers. In that 
sense even a right-wing government is "nice" to the workers. A negative 
>. would effectively amount to a tax on wages. 
Before presenting the solution of the government's problem we may 
compare this model with the one put forth in Alesina and Rodrik {1991). 
There the government chooses to tax wealth. Apart from that the model 
here and theirs are almost identical. In their set-up a right-wing gov-
ernment (/3 = 0) solving the related problem above pursues a growth 
maximizing policy. The growth rate in their model is a concave function 
of rand is given by -y= (r- r)- p, where r = aA[(1- >.)r]1-"'. The 
growth maximizing tax rate is given by r = f = [a(1 - a)A]ll"' and 
). = 0. 
Let us call their growth rate 'Yw and the one used here 'Ym· Note 
that from (5) and {18) Tm = aA[(1- >.)rwp]1-"' with Tm = PTw. Then the 
following Proposition holds. 
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Proposition 1: If p 2: 1 then 'Ym > 'Yw for all r. If p > ar=t> then 
'Ym > 'Yw at r = f. 
Proof: Substituting in the growth rate expressions for 'Ym > 'Yw leads 
1 
to [1- ::] r=;; < p. Then the first part of the proposition holds. 
Substituting in f establishes the second part. 
So it appears that implementing an income cum investment subsidy 
tax scheme may lead to higher growth than under wealth taxation if the 
Capitalists are sufficiently impatient. 
The solution of the government's problem establishes 
Proposition 2: The growth maximizing tax rate is r = TM = 1 - v. 
The right-wing government chooses 
- [ {1 )Ajl/a {1 - Tr )lfa - - {1 - Tr )lfa 
Tr- 0! - 0! - T p p 
(29) 
The left-wing government chooses 
T[ = TM = 1 - V and A 2: 0. (30) 
The left-wing government's country grows faster than the right-
wing government's country. 
Proof: Cf. Appendix A.2. 
It is usually argued that redistribution lowers growth. Given the 
tax scheme employed in this paper this may not be true. There is room 
for redistribution under the particular tax scheme considered in this pa-
per. One may envisage situations where a left-wing government chooses 
i 
1 
r ::; TM and so opts for non-maximal growth, but still grows faster than a 
country whose government solely represents the interest of capital own-
ers. The reason that a right-wing government does not maximize growth 
is that the tax scheme hurts the Capitalists' consumption stream. This 
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constrains the maximization of the growth rate. The results of Proposi-
tion 2 become even stronger if the Capitalists are sufficiently impatient, 
as has been argued in Proposition 1. So there may be instances where 
even a right-wing government would wish to implement the tax scheme 
considered here. 
Also note that the left-wing country optimally lets the capital own-
ers just about survive. In the appendix it is shown that a left-wing 
government will not redistribute if the workers are very patient or if the 
economy is very efficient (high A). Hence, there are circumstances under 
which redistribution is possible with high growth. 
3 Tax Competition in a Two-Country 
World with Perfect Capital Mobility 
The question we shall pose ourselves in this section is: 
What happens to the optimal choices of tax rates and redistri-
bution parameters if these choices have to be made in a two-
country world with capital mobility and costly capital transfers 
and countries cannot coordinate their policies? 
This is a relevant question for countries where full tax harmoniza-
tion may not be possible. There is a possibility then that countries engage 
in tax competition.12 
We will look for a Nash Equilibrium of the game described below. 
The strategies of the two governments are the choices of lh, 02 , A and 
Bi, B~, A*. Only plire strategies choices are consideredP 
For the formulation of the game we have in mind we will employ 
the following 
12For a similar point cf. e.g. Bovenberg (1994). 
13Cf. e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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Assumptions: 
1. There is no uncertainty. Perfect knowledge about all the parame-
ters, objective functions, the strategies and the sequence of moves 
prevails. 
2. All agents act non-cooperatively. 
3. The governments move simultaneously. 
4. The private sector, that is, the Workers and the Capitalists move 
simultaneously. 
5. The governments move before the private sector. 
6. At each point in time the agents are confronted with the same 
problem. 
7. Agents remember at t only what they have done at date 0. 
8. k0 = k0, i.e. both countries have the same initial capital stock. 
(Unless stated otherwise.) 
9. A = A*, i.e. the countries are equally efficient or similar. (Unless 
stated otherwise.) 
10. p = p*, i.e. the countries' rate of time preference is equal across 
countries. 
Assumption (5.) defines a game whose solution is called a Ramsey 
Equilibrium. This is similar to a Stackelberg Leadership Solution, where 
the governments are the Stackelberg leaders. Assumption (6.) defines 
a repeated game and (7.) means that the information structure is open-
loop.14 Also, if the Capitalists can invest in a global environment it makes 
sense to assume that they have the same rate of time preference. 
14The justification for assuming this information structure may lie in the fact that 
democratic gove=ents of either political leaning may constantly be reminded of their 
pre-election promises so that the outcome of the game in the first stage provides a 
benchmark for their decisions at timet. If the gove=ents could remember the whole 
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3.1 The Government's Objective 
Denote the domestic and foreign government by IIi and IIi* where i = 
left (1), right (r), respectively.· We will con8ider government objectives 
where each government would like to have as much capital in its country 
as possible and maximize its domestic objective function. It is shown 
that this is consistent with the objectives as put forth in the set-up of 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991). 
To see this note the following: The governments have to take the 
w1 s as given from the second stage of the game. For the argument to 
follow the only thing we need is that the investors take the price paths 
of Tt, Wt and the taxes as given and then choose their optimal w1 s. Then 
the government goes through a comparative static thought exercise and 
indirectly chooses optimal w1 s through its choice of tax parameters: 
For what is to follow and to keep matters simple we will define 
capital flight as a situation where one country gets all the capital. For 
the domestic country this would amount to w = 1 and w* =;: 0 for instance. 
A change in the composition of the overall installed capital stock 
is given by dK = w dk + (1 - w*) dk*. Noting that k0 = k0 a small 
change in k or k* has a positive effect on K. and this change depends on 
w, w*. Hence, for governments that prefer more capital to less policies 
affecting k or k* play an important role. Note that we have assumed that 
domestic and foreign capital are substitutes in production. For this we 
will contemplate governments that do not prefer domestic over foreign 
capital. 
From our earlier discussion we know .that the Capitalists take r, r* 
as given and that firms pay each factor its marginal product, also taking 
prices as given. . Thus, in a competitive situation the agents and the 
history of the game, time inconsistency issues would emerge. Modelling problems 
of time inconsistency and assuming appropriate. trigger strategies for a closed loop 
information structure is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus it is implicitly assumed 
that governments commit themselves to their decisions. How this commitment is 
enforced is outside of this model. References .for dynamic games are e.g. Petit (1990) 
and Basar and Olsder(1982) .. 
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firms do not take account of their effect on G. From the fact that the 
production function is constant returns to scale with respect K and L it 
follows that gross capital income is given by r K = aY and gross wage 
income by wL = (1- a)Y. The effect of more capital, i.e. an increase in 
k or in k* on domestic output from the government's viewpoint is given 
by 
(31) 
where Yk and Yk· are the partial derivatives with respect to k and k* 
respectively, evaluated at the second stage equilibrium values of thew's. 
These derivatives are given by 
Yk = [aAK"'-1G1-"' + (1 - a)AK"'G-"'t1] w 2:: 0, (32a) 
Yk· = [aAK"'-1G1-"' + (1- a)AK"'G-"'t2] (1- w*) 2:: 0 (32b) 
and are evaluated at L = 1 and the optimal w' s from the second stage 
of the game. It follows that dY 2:: 0. Thus, an increase in k and in k* 
raises domestic output. But it also raises the gross income of both types 
of agents, since 
d(rK) = adY 2::0 and d(wL) = (1- a) dY 2::0. (33) 
So more capital in the domestic country leads to higher income. This in 
turn loosens the budget constraints of both Capitalists and Workers as 
can be seen from (8) and (17). 
This means that an increase in k and k* is in the interest of right-
wing and left-wing governments. For consistency with the objective func-
tions as put forth in section 2. 7 all we require then are objective functions 
that are {a) continuous in tax parameters and increasing in (k, k*) given 
w and (1 - w*). 
We know from the theory of optimal taxation that the government's 
problem can be stated in terms of the indirect utility function.15 
15Note that the welfare function is a function of the government's instruments and 
that this function need not necessarily coincide with the individual agents' utilities as 
noted in e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1989), chpt.12 and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) . 
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Out of this class of objective functions we will consider the fol-
lowing welfare function for the domestic right-wing (r) and left-wing (1) 
government, II: 
1r = l,r (34) 
where D := w + (1 - w*), Ck = Cf + c; and w, w* are taken as given by 
the government. V"" has the following properties 3V{ for Bi,j = 1,2 and 
. . J 
V{, vk-: > 0, V1 ;::: 0, VO.oi :::; 0 and VD=O :::; 0, i,j = 1, 2. (35) 
In Appendix A.1 it is shown that (34) satisfies (a) and represents 
in a concise form the properties of the indirect utility functions of both 
the agents and the governments.16 V1 ;::: 0 reflects the fact that only 
left-wing governments ({J = 1) derive utility from redistribution. VO.o; :::; 
0 is assumed for consistency with the closed economy solution where 
we argued that right-wing governments do not wish to hurt the capital 
owners too much. 
We may note that (34) incorporates an important feature of com-
petition for capital. Having argued that capital is good for right-wing 
and left-wing governments, the objectives of each government are to get 
as much capital as possible, i.e. Vj1)
1 
> Vj1)
2 
if D 1 > D 2• Then the ideal 
situation for e.g. the domestic country would be one where all the capital 
would be invested at home, w = 1 and w* = 0. 
The objective function also makes it possible for each government 
to pursue its domestically preferred policy, r E [rr, Tt]· This is captured 
by the fact that a right-wing government, {J = 0, is only concerned about 
the Capitalists' welfare. This is tantamount to choosing taxes in a way 
so as to guarantee high k and k*. 
For the rest of the paper this objective function will be assumed to 
represent the governments' objectives, 
a national government usually only represents the interests of its own citi-
zens, the Capitalists' consumption abroad also enters this function. Alternative for-
mulations are possible. For instance, the domestic government could also act in the 
interest of the foreign capitalists present in the domestic country. An earlier version 
of this paper used that objective function. Both formulations yield identical results. 
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3.2 Competition for Capital 
In this section we will look for a Nash equilibrium in tax rates and there-
distribution parameters .X, .X*. From the assumptions about the game the 
following should be noted: Given the timing of moves and the assumption 
on the information structure the game is reduced to a repeated two-stage 
game. First the public sector moves and then the private sector. For our 
game this means that given the investment decision of the Capitalists, 
i.e. w and (1- w*), the governments decide on the tax rates and redistri-
bution. Given the tax rates and .X, .X* the private sector decides on where 
to invest. 
Let us note that the growth rate of domestically installed capital is 
given by r = V"fk + V*"fk• where V := ~; and v* := (l-'i)k• are the shares 
of domestic and foreign capital in domestically installed capital. 
Solving backwards requires a government to ma:xin;llze (34) w.r.t. 
81, 82 , .X taking its opponent's choices of (Bi, e;_, .X*) as given. The solution 
to this problem is presented in Appendix A.3 and leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: For two similar countries there exist nine classes of pure 
strategy Nash Equilibria. The gross retun:tS are equal, r = r*, 
and the investors are indifferent where to go, i.e. w .E [0, 1] .and 
w* E [0, 1] and never pay more than the average tax rates, which 
are equal across countries and equal the maximum rate, r = r* = 
TM = 1- v. No redistribution takes place, i.e . .X, .X*= 0 regardless 
·of political preferences. Capital flight may occur in two classes Of 
pure strategy equilibria. Both couiitries grow at the same rate, 
r = 'Yk = "/k• = r* if no capital flight occurs. 
Therefore, in a situation where both countries are equally efficient 
both governments optimally act as a left~wing government would by set-
ting the growth maximizing tax rates. This is contrast to Rehme (1995) 
where it shown that wealth tax competition optimally involves the coun:-
tries to act· as right-wing goverillnents. 
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Note also that Proposition 3 predicts that we will see a very unequal 
distribution of capital over time. Tax competition provides a force that 
perpetuates this inequality. 
This result, of course, is of limited applicability for real life situa-
tions since the occurrence of the event of finding two economies that are 
identical is almost zero. The usefulness of Proposition 3 lies in the fact 
that it provides a benchmark for the following result that is proved in 
Appendix A.4. 
Proposition 4: If two different countries' governments compete for cap-
ital the more efficient country, A > A*, always gets all the capi-
tal, w = 1, w* = 0. The inefficient country, A* < A, chooses 
8i = 82 = rM: regardless of political preferences, i.e. /3* = 1, (0). 
The efficient country (A> A*) chooses either 
1. if f3 = 0 then 81 = 82 = Tr::::; rM: such that rr > rM- and A= 0, 
or 
2. if f3 = 1 then 81 = 82 = Ti = TM, where A;::: 0 such that 
r[(1- A)8M] > rM-
An efficient right-wing country's government gets the same amount 
of capital as a redistributing efficient left-wing one, i.e. wfi1 = wJir = 
0 and w = 1. Efficient right or left-wing governments' countries 
grow at the same rate. 
This proposition derives an extreme result that follows from the 
extreme investment behaviour of the Capitalists coupled with perfect 
capital mobility. The model would predict that redistribution is possible 
if a country is more efficient than the other one. Redistribution then de-
pends on the opponent's technology. Also note that an efficient left-wing 
government will get more capital and guarantee a higher after-tax return. 
Its growth rate will therefore also be higher as shown below. If there is an 
efficiency difference there is hence a possibility for a left-wing government 
to pursue a policy which will have higher growth than its opponent and 
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redistribution. The redistributive freedom is limited by the efficiency dif-
ference. For an inefficient left-wing government redistribution is always 
suboptimal. 
We will now look at the dynamic equilibrium of the domestic econ-
omy under Proposition 4. From (8) and (16) we get 'Yc = 'Yk· The same 
holds for the foreign Capitalists. In the two-country world the resource 
constraint for the domestic country is given by 
I = k = r[wk + (1 - w*)k*] - Cf - Cf. (36) 
Now define CK = Cf + Cf where it is important to note CK i= Ck. Then 
CK is the aggregate consumption of the domestic and foreign Capitalists 
consuming the domestic output and we have used the binding constraint, 
cw = [7] + .>.r]K. Given the constancy of the after-tax return, dividing 
(36) by K, taking logarithms and time derivatives yields KIK =GIG. 
From the production function we get k I K = Y IY by a similar proce-
dure. One may then verify that the aggregate growth rate on a balanced 
growth path is given by 
r = y IY = 6 IC = k I J( = V"fk + v*'Yk•. (37) 
This completely characterizes the dynamic equilibrium for the efficient 
economy. The inefficient economy gets no capital, w* = 0, w = 1, and so 
does not grow at all. Hence for A> A* we haver> r* = 0. 
From this it is clear that an efficient redistributing government 
pays redistribution by an efficiency difference vis-a-vis its opponent. If 
this difference is small, redistribution will be small as well. Should one 
observe redistribution, though, the inequality in the capital distribution 
will decrease over time. Thus, inequality reducing policies are ultimately 
made possible by aggregate efficiency differences. The striking feature of 
Proposition 4 is that redistribution may be coupled with high growth. 
Notice that the Workers of the inefficient country inevitably perish 
and that the Capitalists across countries just survive (v small) and the 
Workers of the efficient country get better and better off. 
Another interesting implication of this proposition is that any ef-
ficient country will always select the tax rate that a left-wing country 
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would prefer and that the growth rate of efficient left or right-wing coun-
tries are the same. 
Finally, let us note that the equilibria of Propositions 3 and 4 are 
all Pareto-efficientY To see this note that if we took only a tiny amount 
of capital away from the capital possessing country it would be worse off 
which violates the Pareto Principle. 
4 Conclusio;n 
Employing the framework of a simple endogenous growth model with dis-
tributional conflicts seems to imply that if one taxes wealth, the growth 
rate is reduced by redistribution. This is the argument presented e.g. in 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Bertola (1993) and would suggest that 
redistribution always implies lower growth. 
If one extends the growth redistribution trade-off problem to a 
two-country world with perfect capital mobility, extreme investment be-
haviour and introduces non-cooperative behaviour, by which govern-
ments compete in wealth tax rates using the source principle, the pos-
sibility of capital flight features saliently in the optimal decisions of a 
government that wishes to redistribute. 
It has been shown in Rehme (1995) that when the countries are 
technologically different, i.e. one country is more efficient than another 
one, then more capital will locate in the efficient country. If the efficient 
country wishes to redistribute, it can 'afford' to do so without loosing 
any capital. The amount of redistribution depends on who the opponent 
is and in particular on the efficiency gap that distinguishes it from its 
opponents. 
In this paper it is argued that these results are very sensitive to the 
choice of tax base. First it is shown that in a closed economy a capital 
17This provides an ex:an1ple for a recent result stated in Janeba and Peters (1994) 
who have shown that in a gan1e where the payoff functions have discontinuities and 
Nash Equilibria exist, they will be Pareto-efficient. 
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income cum investment subsidy tax scheme allows higher growth than a 
wealth tax scheme if the capital owners are sufficiently impatient. Sec-
ond, in a closed economy a left-wing government's country grows faster 
than a right-wing government's one. The left-wing government becomes 
the growth-maximizer. Growth is lowered by welfare considerations of a 
right-wing government. 
Thus, a right-wing government may opt for a capital income cum 
investment tax scheme instead of a wealth tax scheme if the Capitalists 
are sufficiently impatient. 
Third, in a two-country world with equal efficiency and tax compe-
tition no redistribution takes place and both governments act as left-wing 
governments. This result provides a benchmark for the result to follow 
since the probability of :finding two very similar economies is extremely 
low. 
Fourth, if the countries are differently efficient, the efficient country 
will always get all the capital. The right-wing government will have to 
hurt capital owners and cannot use its preferred domestic policy. An 
efficient left-wing country can redistribute vis~a-vis a right or left-wing 
opponent and experience high growth. Efficient right or left-wing gov-
ernments' countries grow at the same rate. 
This last result is especially interesting if one considers the growth-
redistribution problem. Given this paper's tax scheme there appears 
no real trade-off problem for a redistributing government provided its 
economy is sufficiently efficient. 
These results, however, have to be interpreted cautiously. We have 
only considered one particular tax base. Other tax base choices such as a 
tax on wages may change the results in a two-country world considerably. 
We have abstracted from questions of time inconsistency. If coun-
tries could remember the whole history of the game the outcome might 
well be different. We have not analyzed the role of tariffs. It is quite 
likely that a country that experiences capital outflows or capital flight 
will set up tariffs. It would also be desirable to use a less aggregated 
set-up when investigating the trade-off problem. In reality workers own 
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capital and some rich capital OWilers enter employment. 
These and other problems provide room for further extensions of 
this model and for more research on the so-called trade-off between 
growth and redistribution. 
A Appendix 
A.l The indire'ct utility function 
Let f; denote the derivative of a function f with respect to its i-th ele-
ment. In steady state the Capitalists' consumption is given by (15). Cf 
and C~ are clearly increasing in k. Now substitute for k from (16) to 
obtain 
(A1) 
Maximizing D w.r.t the tax rates yields 
This determines some optimal Bl> 82 • Now take the second derivative 
evaluated at these optimal B' s 
Dn = (1- Bl)pw"'fn, D22 = (1- B1)pw'Y22, (A3) 
D12 = -pw"'f2 + (1- B1)pw'Y12 
Note that 'Yi,'Yii = pw2(7;,7;j)· Define a(1- a)Ar-a = (and let v = 
wkjK and v* = (1- w*)k* jK. Then 
71 = (v;;::: 0, 
i -1 2 7n = -a.,r v, 
and 
712 = -a(r-1vv*, 
72(v* ;;::: 0 (A4) 
722 = -a(r-1v*2 :::; 0. (A5) 
Thus the indirect utility function, vr, is increasing in ( k, k*) and has the 
property that Vo,,ei :::; 0 for i,j = 1, 2. 
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The Workers just consume their wage income plus transfers. This 
is given by (17). Rearranging ( 4) yields T = K(?->.). We can then express 
the Workers' consumption as 
(A6) 
The first expression on the RHS corresponds to the wages and they 
are given by 'TJJ{ = (1- a)AG1-"'J{"'. This expression is increasing in 
k, k*. As to the second expression. G is clearly increasing in k, k* as well. 
A left-wing government wishes to redistribute. Only the second 
expression involves >.. Changes of cw w.r.t. positive changes in >. are 
given (l~>-)2, which is positive. 
Hence, any utility function, V 1, that is increasing in cw satisfies 
(a). Since TJ( T, >.) and 'Y( T, >.), the derivatives w.r.t. ell 82 exist. 
This provides the justification for the restrictions on V"" ( ·) as given 
in (35). Hence, V""(·) may capture the properties of the respective indi-
rect utility functions. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 
The Right-Wing Government 
The Hanilltonian for the right-wing government is given by 
H = ln(pk(1- r))e-pt + J.LJ'(T, )..)k 
Maximizing one obtains the following necessary FOC: 
1 t 
- -- e-P + f.L'Y.- k = 0 1-7 
e-pt 
-- f.L'Y = jL k 
(A7) 
(A8a) 
(A8b) 
Assume that T is independent of time, taking time derivatives of 
(A8a) yields p =-it/ f.L- kjk. Substitution of this in (A8b) and noting 
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that 'Y = kjk yields p = e;:'. Substituting back into (A8a) one gets 
1~ .. = 7· Multiplying out and rearranging implies 
(1 - Tr )lfa A (1 - Tr )lfa 
= r . p p 
Tr = [a(1- a)Ajlfa (A9) 
Note that this solution is indeed independent of time. Thus, there exists 
a time consistent solution justifying our earlier assumption about r. 
The Left-Wing Government 
Setting up the Hamiltonian for the left-wing government's problem im-
plies 
H = ln[1J( r, .X) k] e-ot + f.l'Y( r, .X) k. 
The necessary FOC involve 
1 -6t cw (1J.- + .Xp) ke + f.t r.- k > 0 
.X [c1w (1J>. + rp) ke-ot + f.t r>. k] = 0 
-6t 
__ e- - f.t (r- p) = j.I, 
k 
(A10) 
(Alla) 
(Allb) 
(Allc) 
The tax rate cannot be greater than TM = 1- v. Since 0:::; r:::; 1 in a 
Closed Economy we know from (A11a) that cw 2:: 0, 1].- > 0, r,. > 0 and 
f.t > 0 by assumption. Thus, the expression in (Alla) is positive which 
would imply that r = 1. Hence, r1 = r m = 1 - v. 
Suppose for the moment that the government chooses constant 
paths of r, .X. We have just found that a left-wing government will set 
r = 1 - v, Vt, which may justify this assumption. Suppose r were set 
equal to 1. Then we can invoke the following condition18 
1J>.+rp = -1 
T).. 
(A12) 
18For a justification of this condition cf. the appendix in Alesina and Rodrik (1991) 
and for a detailed derivation Rehme (1994). 
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Equation (Allb) implies 
_1_ k e-flt = - T>. k 
cw J.L1J>.+7p 
1 
-e-6t =J.L cw 
(A13a) 
(A13b) 
From this it follows that: -dw jew- 8 = jJ,f J.L· Dividing (Allc) by J.L 
and using the Balanced Growth Condition leads to 
e-flt 
8=-j.Lk 
With 7 = 1 and using (A14) for the solution of (Allb) implies 
(TJ>. + p) 8 = -r>. (TJ + >.p) 
Recalling the definitions of TJ, 1J>., T>. entails for the above 
a(1- a)2 A2[(1- >.)p]1- 2" 
{A14) 
(A15) 
a{1- a)A[(1- >.)p]">.p = O(A16) 
Note that this solution is independent of time, which justifies our earlier 
assumption. Thus, again we obtain the existence of a time consistent 
solution. 
Let us analyze the effect of changes in ).. on our objective function, 
H, in the neighbourhood of)..= 0. For this we evaluate dHjd).. at)..= 0. 
This reduces to the sign of the following expression. 
Since the left-wing government sets 7 = 1 - v so that the Capitalists 
almost starve it makes sense for the government to set 8 = p so that we 
get 
A left-wing government does not to redistribute if the expression in (A18) 
is negative, that is, if more redistnbution lowers utility if 8 is small or if 
A is large. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 
In step 1 we look at governments with .A= .A* = 0. In step 2 we check 
whether redistribution takes place in equilibrium. 
Step 1 
This step of the proof involves the same procedure as the one presented 
in Rehme (1995), Appendix A.2. First one identifies all possible w,w* 
configurations and checks whether they are candidates of a class of Nash 
Equilibria. As an exercise the reader may check that all nine possible con-
figurations are indeed possible classes of Nash Equilibria. The next step 
involves checking whether each class is indeed a class of Nash Equilibria. 
The argument for proving the existence then runs as follows: 
Consider a situation where 
Bl = B2 = B~ = e; = TM and wE [0,1] Aw* E [0,1] (A19) 
This concisely captures all nine classes. 
Now suppose w E (0, 1) A w* E (0, 1) and we cut B1 by a some 
amount E to B~. The resulting changes are denoted by ('). Then r' < r*. 
Sow*-> 1, where-> denotes "goes to" .19 Since B~ < B2 = Bm r falls even 
more so that r' < < r = r*. But then w .__. 0. So the domestic country is 
worse off. 
Now suppose you raise B1 to B~. Then r' > r = r* and w -> 1 and 
r' > > r so that w* -> 0 so that the foreign country is worse off. 
Sinrilar reasoning applies to changes in all the other tax rates so 
that we must have B1 = B2 = Bi = Bi. 
Now suppose B1 > Bi then w -> 1 and w* -> 0 so the domestic 
country is definitely better off. The same holds for the foreign country. 
Thus, in equilibrium we must have B1 = B2 = Bi = Bi = TM. 
Since B; E [v, 1- v] we would have that BM = 1- v. 
19This should not be confused with "converges to". 
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Analogous reasoning applies to w configurations of e.g. ( w = 1, w* = 
1), (w = 1,w* E (0, 1)) or even (w = 1,w* = 0). 
Step 2 
From Step 1 we know that that 7 = 7* = 7M· If A 2: 0 then r < r(7M)· 
First suppose the other government is right-wing. Then it can find a 
8r, 82 combination so that it gets all the capital. But then from (34) we 
have U1jD=O ::::; 0 so that II1 is worse off. The opposite holds for the foreign 
country if it sets A* 2: 0. 
Now suppose both countries are left-wing. As the capital may bang 
from one country to the other lowering A is good for either government. 
If a government sets 7 i= 7M then the other country gets all the 
capital. Hence, each left-wing government will set A= A* = 0, 71 = 7M 
and 7* = 7M· 
Finally, from (16) it follows that r = 'Yk = 'Yk· = r• except for two 
classes of possible Nash equilibria, where (w = 1,w* = 0) or (w = O,w* = 
1). 0 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 
Let the home country be more efficient, A > A*. I will now show that the 
maximum return in the efficient country is higher than in the inefficient 
one. Assume that A = 0. Recall the expression for r. 
(A20) 
Assume that A= xA*, where x > 1, then r > r* for all 7 = 7*. We will 
express this fact in a little Lemma. 
Lemma 1: If A> A*, then r > r* for all 7 = 7*, 
After having gone through similar arguments for the choice of 81, 82 , 8i, 82 
as put forth in Appendix A.3, we have to distinguish these cases · 
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1. rr*: IIr* sets rM- so that rM-. But then IIr chooses Tr such that rr = 
r(rr) = r* + E > rM-, E --t 0 so by U0.8. < 0 and Lemma 1 w = J J 
1,w* = 0. 
2. rl*: Similar to (1.). 
3. lr*: II1 and IIr* choose TM· >.is chosen such that Tt == r[(1- >.)eM] = 
r* + E > rM- with possibly >. > 0 since Ui 2:: 0 if D > 0 . But then 
w = 1,w* = 0. 
4. ll*: Similar to (3.): 
Since r M, rt, r r > r* we must have wil, = wTI.r = 0 from the private sector's 
reaction, equation (12), and w = 1 for all IIi. 
Finally, since r1 = r[(1- >.)BM] = r* + E = rr = r(rr) the efficient 
countries grow at the same rate. 0 
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